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Abstract—We explore some novel connections between the
main privacy models in use and we recall a few known ones. We
show these models to be more related than commonly understood,
around two main principles: deniability and permutation. In
particular, randomized response turns out to be very modern in
spite of it having been introduced over 50 years ago: it is a local
anonymization method and it allows understanding the protection
offered by ǫ-differential privacy when ǫ is increased to improve
utility. A similar understanding on the effect of large ǫ in terms of
deniability is obtained from the connection between ǫ-differential
privacy and t-closeness. Finally, the post-randomization method
(PRAM) is shown to be viewable as permutation and to be
connected with randomized response and differential privacy.
Since the latter is also connected with t-closeness, it follows that
the permutation principle can explain the guarantees offered by
all those models. Thus, calibrating permutation is very relevant
in anonymization, and we conclude by sketching two ways of
doing it.
Keywords: Differential privacy; randomized response; t-
closeness; PRAM; permutation paradigm; risk and loss aversion.
I. INTRODUCTION
Privacy models in the literature can be split into four
main families, by order of appearance: i) randomized re-
sponse (1965); ii) k-anonymity (1998) and its extensions
(l-diversity (2006), t-closeness (2007), etc.); iii) differential
privacy (2006); and iv) the permutation paradigm (2016).
Although the above models were proposed over a 50-year
span and were initially believed to be fundamentally different
from each other, some connections between pairs of them have
been found in the literature. Such connections can be useful to
the anonymization practitioner because they give more insight
into the risk-utility trade-offs incurred when choosing a certain
parameterization for a specific model.
We explore in this paper several connections from a new
perspective. Section II connects randomized response and
post-randomization (PRAM) in terms of plausible deniability;
thus, randomized response is not only an anonymization
method avant la lettre, but more interestingly a local version
of the PRAM anonymization method. Section III dwells on
the known link between randomized response and differential
privacy, by taking a new approach based on information
theory and deniability; in particular, our analysis allows un-
derstanding the effect on privacy of increasing the ǫ parameter
of differential privacy (in an attempt to improve utility).
Section IV recalls the connection between differential privacy
and t-closeness that we demonstrated in a previous paper; the
novelty is that our deniability-based analysis permits using t-
closeness to assess whether a large ǫ in differential privacy
provides enough protection. Section V views PRAM in terms
of the permutation paradigm. The lessons learned from the
previous sections pave the way to calibrating anonymization
in terms of permutation, whatever the privacy model in use;
this is dealt with in Section VI. Finally, Section VII contains
conclusions and future research issues.
II. RANDOMIZED RESPONSE, PLAUSIBLE DENIABILITY
AND PRAM
Randomized response (RR, [6], [15]) is a mechanism that
respondents to a survey can use to protect their privacy when
asked about the value of sensitive attribute (e.g. did you take
drugs last month?). The interesting point is that the data
collector can still estimate from the randomized responses
the proportion of each of the possible true answers of the
respondents.
Let us denote by X the attribute containing the answer to
the sensitive question. If X can take r possible values, then
the randomized response Y reported by the respondent instead
of X follows a r × r matrix of probabilities
P =


p11 · · · p1r
...
...
...
pr1 · · · prr

 (1)
where puv = Pr(Y = v|X = u), for u, v ∈ {1, . . . , r} denotes
the probability that the randomized response is v when the
respondent’s true attribute value is u.
Let π1, . . . , πr be the proportions of respondents whose
true values fall in each of the r categories of X and let
λv =
∑r
u=1 puvπu for v = 1, . . . , r, be the probability of
the reported value Y being v. If we define λ = (λ1, . . . , λr)
T
and π = (π1, . . . , πr)
T , it holds that λ = PTπ. Furthermore,
if λˆ is the vector of sample proportions corresponding to λ
and P is nonsingular, in Chapter 3.3 of [1] it is proven that
an unbiased estimator π can be computed as
πˆ = (PT )−1λˆ (2)
and they also provide an unbiased estimator of the dispersion
matrix.
A. The privacy model of randomized response: plausible de-
niability
Even if the concept of privacy model (that is, of ex ante
privacy guarantee) was introduced by k-anonymity [10] three
decades after RR had appeared, RR has an implicit privacy
model. The privacy guarantees RR offers to respondents are
plausible deniability and secrecy, as we next analyze.
For each possible value v of the reported attribute Y , by
the Bayes’ formula we have
pˆvu = Pr(X = u|Y = v)
=
Pr(Y = v|X = u) Pr(X = u)∑r
u′=1 Pr(Y = v|X = u
′) Pr(X = u′)
=
puvπu∑
u′=1 pu′vπu′
. (3)
a) Deniability: Imagine that u is an embarrassing value
of X (like a value “Yes” for an attribute X denoting whether
drugs were taken last month). As long as Pr(X = u|Y =
v) < 1, the respondent can deny to have X = u.
Actually, the more similar the probabilities pˆvu correspond-
ing to a given answer Y = v, the higher the deniability.
Therefore, given a reported value Y = v, we can measure
deniability as a conditional Shannon entropy
H(X |Y = v) = −
r∑
u=1
pˆvu log2 pˆvu, (4)
whose maximum value is log2 r, corresponding to the case
when pˆuv takes the same value 1/r for all u = 1, . . . , r.
b) Perfect secrecy: In the special case in which the
probabilities within each column of P are identical (although
perhaps different columns contain different probabilities), Ex-
pression (3) tells us that pˆvu = πu, for u, v ∈ {1, . . . , r}.
Therefore, using Expression (4) we get that H(X |Y = v) =
H(X) for any v, and thus H(X |Y ) = H(X), which implies
perfect secrecy in the Shannon sense [11]: the reported answer
Y gives no information at all on the real value of X .
Unfortunately, the price paid for perfect secrecy is high in
terms of utility: when the probabilities within two or more
columns of P are identical, matrix P is singular, and therefore
the unbiased estimator of Expression (2) cannot be computed.
Finally, having H(X |Y = v) = H(X) for some v
yields an uninformative reported value. It is possible to go
beyond that and make v misinformative, by ensuring that
H(X |Y = v) > H(X). However, since H(X |Y ) ≤ H(X),
if we increase H(X |Y = v) to make it greater than H(X)
for some v, we are forced to decrease H(X |Y = v′) for other
values v′ 6= v.
B. Randomized response: a local version of PRAM
The matrix in Expression (1) looks exactly as the transi-
tion matrix used in the post-randomization method (PRAM)
proposed by [4]. As pointed out in [12], the main difference
between RR and PRAM is who performs the randomization:
whereas in RR it is the respondent before delivering her
response, in PRAM it is the data controller after collecting
all responses (hence the name post-randomization). Therefore,
RR is a local version of PRAM anonymization, which is
not without merit: when RR was invented, the notion of
anonymization did not exist, let alone the notion of local
anonymization.
III. RANDOMIZED RESPONSE AND DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY
A randomized query function κ gives ǫ-differential pri-
vacy [5] if, for all data sets D1, D2 such that one can be
obtained from the other by modifying a single record, and all
S ⊂ Range(κ), it holds
Pr(κ(D1) ∈ S) ≤ exp(ǫ)× Pr(κ(D2) ∈ S. (5)
In plain words, the presence or absence of any single record
is not noticeable (up to exp(ǫ)) when seeing the outcome
of the query. Hence, this outcome can be disclosed without
impairing the privacy of any of the potential respondents
whose records might be in the data set. A usual mechanism to
satisfy Inequality (5) is to add noise to the true outcome of the
query, in order to obtain an outcome of κ that is a noise-added
version of the true outcome. The smaller ǫ, the more noise is
needed to make queries on D1 and D2 indistinguishable up
to exp(ǫ).
In [13], [14], a connection between RR and differential
privacy is established: RR is ǫ-differentially private if
eǫ ≥ max
v=1,...,r
maxu=1,...,r puv
minu=1,...,r puv
. (6)
The rationale is that the values in each column v (v ∈
{1, . . . , r}) of matrix P correspond to the probabilities of
the reported value being Y = v, given that the real value
is X = u for u ∈ {1, . . . , r}. Differential privacy requires
that the maximum ratio between the probabilities in a column
be bounded by eǫ, so that the influence of the real value X
on the reported value Y is limited. Thus, the reported value
can be released with limited disclosure of the real value.
A. Connection with entropy
The smaller the value of ε in Inequality (6), the more similar
the probabilities puv (u = 1, . . . , r) in the columns of P,
for columns v = 1 to r. In turn, the more similar these
probabilities, the more pˆvu approaches πu, as it can be seen
from Expression (3).
In the extreme case, when ǫ = 0, Inequality (6) forces
the probabilities within each column to be identical to
each other (although not necessarily equal to probabilities
in other columns). As shown in Section II-A, this im-
plies H(X |Y ) = H(X). Therefore, if randomized response
achieves the strictest differential privacy (ǫ = 0), it also
achieves perfect secrecy in the Shannon sense.
Yet, one might argue that conditional entropy H(X |Y )
captures more information than Inequality (6), because it takes
all probabilities into account, whereas Inequality (6) (and
hence the above connection of RR with differential privacy)
only takes into account the maximum and the minimum
probabilities in each column.
B. Explaining large ǫ in terms of deniability
One of the shortcomings of the differential privacy model
is that its ex ante privacy guarantee is only intuitive when
ǫ is very small. Specifically, when one takes not-so-small ǫ
values in Expression (5) to preserve more utility, the privacy
guarantee is hard to explain: is ǫ is not that small, one cannot
guarantee any more that the presence or absence of any single
record/respondent is really unnoticeable.
The connection with randomized response and hence deni-
ability given by Inequality (6) is useful to gain an intuition
on what large ǫ implies. We illustrate this in the following
example.
Example 1: If one takes ǫ = 2, this means that in some
columns of P the ratio between the largest probability and
the smallest probability may be as large as e2 = 7.389. In
particular, if say, r = 2, one might have a column v with one
probability p1v = 0.7389 and the other probability p2v = 0.1.
In this situation, if the prior probabilities of the two values
of X are similar, Expression (3) tells us that, after reporting
Y = v, the most likely value of X is 1 and there is only a
narrow margin for denying it. This clearly shows that ǫ = 2
does not seem to provide enough privacy.
IV. DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY AND t-CLOSENESS
Given two random distributions F1 and F2 taking values in
a discrete set {x1, x2, · · · , xt}, consider the following distance
between them:
d(F1, F2) = max
i=1,2,···,t
{
PrF1(xi)
PrF2(xi)
,
PrF2(xi)
PrF1(xi)
}
. (7)
In Expression (7), we take the quotients of probabilities to be
zero if both PrF1(xi) and PrF2(xi) are zero, and to be infinity
if only the denominator is zero.
In [3], it is proven that, if an anonymized static data set
satisfies exp(ε/2)-closeness [7] (an extension of k-anonymity)
when the distance between the distribution of the sensitive
attributes over entire data set and the distribution of the
sensitive attribute within a cluster of records is measured using
Expression (7), then the data set satisfies differential privacy
in the sense stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 1: Let kI(D) be the function that returns the
view on subject I’s sensitive attributes given a data set D.
If D satisfies exp(ε/2)-closeness when using the distribution
distance of Expression (7), then kI(D) satisfies ε-differential
privacy. In other words, if we restrict the domain of kI to
exp(ε/2)-close data sets, then we have ε-differential privacy
for kI .
Proposition 1 is helpful to explain differential privacy in
terms of an intruder’s knowledge gain on the sensitive attribute
values of a target respondent if the intruder can determine the
target respondent’s cluster. This is shown in the next example.
Example 2: If one uses ǫ-differential privacy with ǫ = 2, by
Proposition 1 the probability weight attached to a certain value
of a sensitive attribute X can grow by a factor of e ≈ 2.718
if the target individual’s cluster is learned by the intruder. If
the probability attached to a sensitive value in the cluster-level
distribution is deemed too high, then one needs to reduce ǫ.
To decide whether a probability has grown too much, one
can resort to the connection with deniability highlighted in
Section II-A, as follows:
• Consider that the reported value v is now the cluster
identifier.
• Consider that the probabilities pˆvu = Pr(X = u|Y =
v), for u = 1, . . . , r are the probabilities assigned by
the cluster-level distribution to the values of the sensitive
attribute within the cluster (we assume without loss of
generality that the cluster contains r different values).
With the above considerations, the problem of determining
the real value X given the reported value Y becomes the
problem of finding the target respondent’s sensitive value X
given the target respondent’s cluster Y . Thus, we can use the
following deniability argument to assess whether the cluster-
level distribution has become too inhomogeneous:
Example 3: Assume the sensitive attribute can take r = 5
different values and that its data set-level empirical distribution
is uniform, so that the relative frequency of each value is 1/5.
Take ǫ = 2 as in Example 2. A cluster-level distribution where
one value has relative frequency 1/5× exp(1) = 0.5436 and
the remaining four values have relative frequencies 0.1141
satisfies exp(1)-closeness; therefore, according to Proposi-
tion 1, it satisfies 2-differential privacy. However, whereas
an intruder cannot guess the sensitive attribute value for a
target respondent upon seeing the data set-level distribution,
the guess is much easier if the intruder knows the target
respondent’s cluster, because one of the values concentrates
more than 50% of the relative frequency. Thus, ǫ = 2 does
not seem to offer enough protection.
V. PRAM AND THE PERMUTATION PARADIGM
In [2], a permutation paradigm of anonymization was in-
troduced. The authors first presented the following algorithm,
that considers in turn each attribute X in an original data set
X and the corresponding attribute Y in the anonymized data
set Y, and outputs an attribute Z that is called the reverse-
mapped version of X :
Require: Original attribute X = {x1, x2, · · · , xn}
Require: Anonymized attribute Y = {y1, y2, · · · , yn}
for i = 1 to n do
Compute j = Rank(yi)
Set zi = x(j) (where x(j) is the value of X of rank j)
end for
return Z = {z1, z2, · · · , zn}
From the algorithm description, Z is a permutation of
X , and the rank order of Z is the same as the rank order
of Y . Since the above algorithm makes no assumption on
the anonymization procedure being used, it follows that any
microdata anonymization technique is functionally equivalent
to performing the following two steps one after the other:
1) Permutation. Each attribute X of the original dataset is
permuted into the corresponding Z . Thus, the data set
X is transformed into a data set Z.
2) Residual noise addition. Noise is added to each value
of Z to obtain the anonymized data set Y (the noise is
residual, because the ranks of Z and Y must stay the
same).
Let us now look at how PRAM fits in the permutation
paradigm. PRAM does not permute in the sense of swapping
attribute values between records in the data set. Rather, it
permutes in the domain of attributes: that is, a data set
anonymized with PRAM may contain attribute values not
present in the original data set. Hence, in terms of the per-
mutation paradigm, PRAM should be viewed as permutation
plus some noise. However, if Y is a PRAM-ed data set, it
can be reverse-mapped to a permuted data set Z as explained
above.
VI. CALIBRATING ANONYMIZATION
In Section II we connected PRAM and randomized re-
sponse, in Section III we connected randomized response and
differential privacy, in Section IV we connected differential
privacy and t-closeness and in Section V we connected PRAM
and the permutation paradigm. Therefore, the privacy notions
captured by all those privacy models are less different than it
seems. In particular, all of them can be expressed in terms of
any of the two following basic privacy ideas: deniability and
permutation.
As illustrated in the examples above, deniability is useful
to understand the privacy implications of relaxing the privacy
parameters of ǫ-differential privacy or t-closeness in quest of
utility.
Permutation may also be useful to understand the level of
privacy achieved and calibrate the anonymization parameters
suitably. In [8], we showed how to use the permutation
distance to find anonymization parameters that make any
linkage claimed by an intruder between the anonymized data
set and an external identified data set plausibly deniable by
the data controller. In general, the stronger the anonymization,
the more similar the permutation distances to those of random
permutation, and the more linkage deniability. In the extreme
case, a very strong anonymization can be viewed as a ran-
dom permutation yielding random-looking data; any linkage
between random-looking data and original data is intrinsically
deniable.
We next explore two tools to calibrate permutation to
attain suitable protection against disclosure and acceptable
information loss. Due to the connections between permutation
and the main privacy models shown in this paper, calibrating
permutation can have broad applicability.
A. (d,v, f)-permuted privacy
A privacy model called (d,v, f)-permuted privacy inspired
in the above permutation paradigm was proposed in [2]. Given
a vector d = (d1, . . . , dm) of non-negative integers, a vector
v = (v1, . . . , vm) of non-negative real numbers, an original
data set X and an anonymized data set Y both with m
attributes, and a record-level mapping f : X −→ Y, we say
Y satisfies (d,v, f)-permuted privacy with respect to original
record x = (x1, . . . , xm) ∈ X if yj∗ being the value of the
j-attribute Y j in the anonymized data set closest to xj for
j = 1, . . . ,m,
1) The anonymized record f(x) = (y1, . . . , ym) satisfies
|Rank(yj)− Rank(yj
∗
)| ≥ dj (j = 1, 2, . . . ,m)
(dj is called the permutation distance for the j-th
attribute);
2) If Sj(dj) is the set of values of the sorted Y
j whose
rank differs no more than dj from the rank of y
j
∗, then
the diversity of Sj(dj) is greater than v
j according to a
given diversity criterion.
If anonymization is just a permutation, then yj∗ = x
j . For
each original record x, the data protector can take as f(x)
the anonymized record derived from x. Diversity criteria for
Sj(dj) may be the variance, one of the l-diversity criteria, or
the t-closeness criterion. If (d,v, f)-permuted privacy holds
w.r.t. all records in X, then we say it holds for the dataset X.
If an anonymization method M with parameter parms
is used to obtain the anonymized version Y of an original
data set X, the data protector can compute what values of
d and v the (d,v, f)-permuted privacy model holds with.
If the variabilities in v are not deemed sufficient or if the
permutation distances in d are not enough to provide deniable
linkages, then the anonymization parameters parms should be
stronger or the method M should be changed.
B. Aggregation measures based on power means
Also drawing inspiration on the permutation paradigm,
an aggregation measure based on power means was pro-
posed in [9] to aggregate the absolute permutation distances
p1, . . . , pn resulting from anonymizing the values of an at-
tribute in the n records of a data set:
J((p1, . . . , pn), α) =
{ (
1
n
∑n
i=1 p
α
i
) 1
α for α 6= 0;
Πni=1p
1
n
i for α = 0,
(8)
where α < 1 turns the above measure into a disclosure
risk measure and α > 1 into an information loss measure.
Indeed, the more α approaches −∞, the greater is the weight
of smaller permutation distances in Expression (8); since
disclosure occurs when permutation distances for some values
are too small, we have a disclosure risk measure when α
is small. On the other hand, the more α approaches +∞,
the greater is the weight of larger permutation distances in
Expression (8); since large permutation distances are the ones
that most deteriorate utility, we have an information loss
measure when α is large. Thus, for α < 1, the greater the value
of of J((p1, . . . , pn), α), the more disclosure risk, whereas, for
α > 1, the greater the value of J((p1, . . . , pn), α), the more
information loss.
From the above discussion, when α < 1, we have that
α behaves as a risk aversion parameter: the smaller the α
value chosen by the data controller, the more intolerable is
disclosure considered. Analogously, when α > 1, we have
that α behaves as an information loss aversion parameter: the
larger the α chosen by the data controller, the more intolerable
is information loss.
Thus, if the controller is able to parameterize her risk
aversion by choosing α1 < 1 and her information loss aversion
by choosing α2 > 1, she can use J((p1, . . . , pn), α1) and
J((p1, . . . , pn), α2) to calibrate the anonymization method M
and its parameters parms. Admittedly, choosing the right
α1 and α2 and assessing whether J((p1, . . . , pn), α1) and
J((p1, . . . , pn), α2) are acceptable may not be intuitive in
most cases.
Anyway, these power-means measures may be used to
compare the disclosure protection and the information loss
achieved by two different anonymization methods M and M ′
(or by the same method M with different parameters parms
and parms′).
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH
We have highlighted several connections between privacy
models, which gives a deeper insight into their nature. They
turn out to be more related than anticipated, around the princi-
ples of deniability and permutation. In particular, randomized
response turns out to be very modern in spite of it having been
introduced more than 50 years ago: it is a local anonymization
method and it allows understanding the protection offered by
ǫ-differential privacy when ǫ is increased to improve utility.
A similar understanding of the effects of a larger ǫ can be
gained by looking at the connection between ǫ-differential
privacy and t-closeness under the light of deniability. Finally,
since PRAM can be viewed as permutation and is connected
with randomized response and differential privacy, and the
latter is connected to t-closeness, the permutation principle
can be used to explain the guarantees offered by all those
models. Hence, calibrating permutation is a matter of high
interest in anonymization, and we have sketched two ways of
approaching this issue.
Future research will involve giving more detailed guidelines
for calibrating privacy models and anonymization methods in
view of optimizing the trade-off between disclosure risk and
information loss. Also, the knowledge gained on the common
underlying principles of those models and methods should
be helpful to tackle the grand challenge of applying and/or
adapting them to big data.
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